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Abstract—Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) cache spoofing
or poisoning is an OSI layer 2 attack that exploits the state-
lessness vulnerability of the protocol to make network hosts
susceptible to issues such as Man in the Middle attack, host
impersonation, Denial of Service (DoS) and session hijacking.
In this paper, a quantitative research approach is used to
propose forensic tools for capturing evidences and mitigating
ARP cache poisoning. The baseline approach is adopted to
validate the proposed tools. The evidences captured before
attack are compared against evidences captured when the
network is under attack in order to ascertain the validity of
the proposed tools in capturing ARP cache spoofing evidences.
To mitigate the ARP poisoning attack, the security features
DHCP Snooping and Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI) are
enabled and configured on a Cisco switch. The experimentation
results showed the effectiveness of the proposed mitigation
technique.
Keywords-ARP cache poisoning; Forensic investigation; At-
tack mitigation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Computer networks provide means through which users
communicate, and make purchases through the Internet. Pro-
viding security to computer networks becomes imperative
as the use of Internet in e-commerce and communication
increases, proliferation of computer network threats is also
spreading fast [1]. There are a variety of computer network
threats operating at different layers of computer network [2].
These threats include DoS, DDoS, ARP cache spoofing,
DNS poisoning, viruses etc. [3].
Controls needed for protecting computers from threats
or attacks are dependent on decision variables that the
management of an organization makes [4]. When a particular
threat becomes a concern, controls needed for mitigating
such such attacks should be be convergent [5]. Hence, to
prevent ARP cache spoofing threats on the network, decision
tools such as baseline approach or risk assessment approach
need to be adopted to ascertain that all controls needed
to mitigate such attacks as part of organization’s Business
Impact Analysis (BIA) are considered [6].
Some organizations make Business Impact Analysis
(BIA) for controls to mitigate attacks on their informa-
tion assets. Usually, they focus on external attacks coming
from outside their network, while neglecting internal attacks
launched from inside the network. In some other settings, an
organization could have controls in place, however it may
neglect the fact that a computer network is considered secure
only if the vulnerability in it has not yet been discovered.
Hence, this type of organizations may fail to put forensics
tools in place against unknown attacks. It is important that
they are able to study those attacks which could help them
forestall feature occurrence and possibly identify source of
attacks whether internal to the organization or external [7].
ARP cache spoofing is the commonest attack that can be
launched from within a network and could have a very high
destruction profile to an organization.
The purpose of this research work is to use baseline
approach to validate the proposed forensics and mitigation
approach against; (1) ARP cache spoofing, (2) Man in the
Middle attack, (3) Host impersonation, (4) Denial of Service
attack (DoS), (5) Session hijacking.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
gives an overview on attacks based on ARP cache poisoning.
Section III summarizes related work in the literature. Sec-
tion IV describes the investigation and mitigation method-
ology adopted. Section V presents the forensic investigation
approach, followed by a detailed analysis of validation
results. The mitigation approach is presented in Section VI.
Finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
II. OVERVIEW OF INTERNAL ATTACKS BASED ON ARP
CACHE POISONING
A. Man in the Middle Attack
Man in the Middle (MitM) attack is a hacking methodol-
ogy whereby an attacker poisoned the ARP caches of two
communicating hosts to intercept their communication with
the aim of causing host exploitation such as session hijack-
ing, theft of sensitive data, port stealing and impersonation
of login credential [8]. To launch the attack, the attacker first
collect the MAC addresses of its victims by broadcasting an
ARP request to the victims’ entire network. After that, the
attacker sends an ARP reply to the victim hosts in order to
associate their IP addresses to its MAC address.
B. Denial of Service (DoS) Attack
According to [9], DoS is an exploitation of ARP cache
poisoning by an attacker to identify itself as the default
gateway to the victim host. Thus, all traffic sent to the
gateway will be redirected to the attacker which will choose
to drop. The attacker can also give the victim host a fake
default gateway which does not exist on the network. Hence,
the victim host will lose connection to the network.
C. Host Impersonation
An adversary can exploit ARP cache poisoning to imper-
sonate another host and gain access to sensitive information
sent to this host [10].
D. Session Hijacking
Session hijacking consists in taking over an active com-
munication session of a legitimate user (i.e., victim) once it
has authenticated to a server [11].
III. RELATED WORK
Gouda and Huang [12] proposed a mitigation technique
for ARP cache poisoning using invite-accept protocol and
request-reply protocol such that host computers on the
network could have their IP-MAC address binding stored
on a database of a centralized server on the network. A host
computer uses the protocols to get any host it needs to com-
municate with on the network. However, [13] argued that
the implementation of this technique requires the alteration
of ARP protocol of every. Moreover, the server could be a
single point of failure and proposed mitigation technique is
prune to DoS attack.
A Spooﬁng Prevention Method (SPM) is proposed in [14],
where a distinctive key is associated with the source and
destination domains. The key is appended into a packet at
the source end and veriﬁed at the destination end.
[15] proposed the use of Hash Message Authentication
Code (HMAC) to check the integrity and authenticity of
user cookies. HMAC is computed on four concatenated
variables: username, expiration time, data, and session key.
The cookies are stored on the server side which complicates
the possibility of session hijacking to an attacker. However,
the proposed protocol is not scalable due to its reliance on
SSL. In a related development, [16] proposed SessionLock; a
mitigation technique against session hijacking. To this end,
SessionLock relies on a session secret to generate unique
authentication tokens and uses HMAC. Also, [17] proposed
SessionShield to prevent session hijacking. SessionShield is
a proxy outside of the browser that inspects all outgoing
requests and incoming responses to identify session cookies,
and then blocks script access to these session cookies.
Nevertheless, the use of a proxy technique poses a scalability
and compatibility issues [18].
Although efforts have been made to provide mitigation
techniques to ARP cache spooﬁng, each proposition has
its weaknesses which makes the quest for an ARP cache
spooﬁng mitigation lingering. Besides, none of the proposi-
tions presented above have addressed the attack issue from
forensics point of view. Whenever there is an attack on a
network, there is always a need to provide evidence which
is conform to forensics investigation standard. This allow
to infer that the attack has really happened and to be able
to identify the source of the attack so that it could be used
against the suspect in the law court [19].
IV. THE PROPOSED INVESTIGATION AND MITIGATION
METHODOLOGY
In this work, a qualitative approach is used to collect
data. A baseline approach is adopted to verify whether
the network is under attack or not using several forensic
tools, namely: TCPdump [20], Wireshark [21], and Linux
commands TCPstat and Ntop. A baseline is a “value or
proﬁle of a performance metric against which changes in
the performance metric can be usefully compared” [6]. In
our case, the evidences captured before attack are compared
against evidences captured when the network is under attack.
To mitigate the ARP cache poisoning attack, DHCP
snooping and dynamic ARP inspection (DAI), two port
security features, are enabled and conﬁgured on the switch.
Those security features are available on the latest Cisco
Catalyst switches, including 6500, 4500 and 2960 Series.
The Cisco Catalyst 2960 Series switch is a reasonable
choice for Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) due to
its affordable price. To validate the proposed mitigation
technique, an experiment network is setup as shown in
Figure 1.
Figure 1. Topology diagram of the network
The network comprises a Cisco router 1841, a Cisco
Catalyst 2960 switch, a victim machine running Windows
7, and a laptop containing two virtual machines (VMs)
running Linux family Operating Systems (OS) on Windows
8.1 professional. The VM running Kali Linux serves as
the attacker host. Two Ethernet-to-USB adapters are used
to connect each of the VMs running on the laptop to the
external DHCP in order to ensure that all hosts are connected
to the same network. The network 192.168.50.0/24 is used
with the default gateway 192.168.50.1 conﬁgured on Fast
Ethernet 0. DHCP is enabled on the router. VLAN 50 is
conﬁgured on the switch. Fast Ethernet 2, 3, 5, 7 and Gigabit
Ethernet 1 interfaces are assigned to VLAN 50. All devices
are put under VLAN 50 to avoid possibility of interference
on the result as a requirement for a valid research design.
To validate the proposed forensics investigation of ARP
cache spooﬁng, comparison will be made between the
forensics evidences collected when there is no attack on
the network against those collected when the network is
under attack. Ettercap is used to launch the ARP cache
poisoning and the corresponding attacks: MitM, DoS, ses-
sion hijacking, and host impersonation. To validate the
proposed mitigation technique, the evidences collected when
the network is under attack with DHCP snooping and DAI
enabled will be compared to those when the two security
features are disabled.
V. FORENSICS INVESTIGATION OF ARP CACHE
POISONING
A. Normal Traffic Flow on the Network
The first evidences were captured when the network
was in normal operation (i.e., no attack) using TCPdump,
Wireshark, TCPstat and Ntop. The extracted evidences will
be used as a baseline to ascertain whether the network is
under attack or not.
Figure 2. TCPdump output when the network traffic was normal
Figure 2 shows the packets collected with TCPdump.
The TCPdump output comprises eleven fields that repre-
sent, respectively: the timestamp, the protocol, the source
IP address and port, the destination IP address and port,
the TCP flags, the relative sequence number, the relative
acknowledgement number, the window size, and the packet
length. For instance, the first line says that an IP packet
was sent at timestamp 23 : 03 : 07 from source port https
on the source host 74.125.206.18 to destination port 49252
on the destination host (in our case, the victim machine)
192.168.50.7. The https denotes that response from source
host was over a Secured Socket Layer (SSL/TLS). The TCP
flags F and P are set in the packet. The FIN flag, F, indicates
the sender’s intention to terminate the connection to the
receiving host. The PUSH flag, P, signals the immediate
push of data from the source host to the destination host.
The packet’s relative sequence number was 0 (seq 0) and it
contained no data (length 0). A sequence number of zero
indicates that this is the first packet sent by the source
in this TCP session. A packet length of zero means that
the packet contains only the header without payload. The
available receive window was 64240 bytes.
The evidences captured by Wireshark are described in Fig-
ure 3. Only ARP traffic is displayed. The results show that
the victim machine with MAC address Dell 31 : ba : fd
and IP address 192.168.50.5 made a broadcast asking for
the MAC address of the default gateway with the IP address
192.168.50.1. It went further to making gratuitous ARP
request of the existing default gateway. When a host’s IP
address changes, a gratuitous ARP packet is transmitted on
Figure 3. Wireshark evidence output when traffic was normal
the network to force any device that receives it to update its
cache with the new IP-to-MAC address mapping.
Figure 4. Output of evidence captured with TCPstate
TCPstat is a network probing application which functions
as an IDS. The traffic statistics depicted in Figure 4 re-
port the estimated number of bytes transmitted per second,
minute, hour, day, and month.
Figure 5. Percentage of Unicast, Broadcast and Multicast packets captured
by Ntop on the network when there was no attack
Figure 5 shows the captured evidences using Ntop. It is
observed that Ntop was activated on Ethernet port 1 (eth1)
operating on a normal Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU)
of 1514. The evidences were captured in 1 hour, 41 minutes,
and 21 seconds. Neither libcap nor ntop have dropped any
packet. Ntop received 6, 123 packets that were processed.
The total number (resp. percentage) of unicast, broadcast,
and multicast packets was 2, 364 (39.7%), 3, 034 (49.6%),
and 718 (11.7%), respectively.
B. Launching an ARP Poisoning Attack
The purpose of launching attack is to find the performance
profile of the attack which will be used to measure the
mitigation capability of DAI and DHCP Snooping on ARP
cache snooping.
Ettercap is used to launch the attack. A unified sniffing
is started on the Ethernet interface connecting the attacker
machine to the network. The interface is placed into promis-
cuous mode. The default gateway and the victim machine
are selected as the first and the second target machine,
respectively. A MitM ARP poisoning attack is then initiated
to spoof the ARP tables of the target machines.
From this point, the plugins ”repoison arp” and
”remote browser” are selected alternately to launch a
session hijacking attack.
C. Evidence Collected under the Attack
From Figure 6, it could be seen that the time stamp
was 23 hours, 17 minutes, and 1 second of the day. The
IP source was from the subnet 74.125.206.0 transmitting
over SSL, and the destination IP address was 192.168.50.7.
The sequence number was 0, the acknowledgement was 1,
length mostly 0, and the TCP flag was [FP] meaning “finish
push”. Although, there was ARP Reply in two places with
the IP address of the default gateway and that of the victim
machine. The length of ARP reply packet is 46 bytes.
Figure 6. Evidence collected with TCPdumps when victim computer was
under attack
In Figure 7, the evidence was collected using Wireshark.
Note that there was a duplicate use of 192.168.50.5 which
was the victim’s IP address. Obviously, the source IP address
was from a cisco device and the destination IP addresses
comprise Dell and cisco devices.
Figure 7. Evidence collected with Wireshark when victim machine was
under attack
From the statistics generated by TCPstat in Figure 8, the
flow rate of data on the network was 8.5KB/Sec.
Figure 8. Evidence collected with TCPstat when victim machine was
under attack
From the Ntop statistics shown in Figure 9, it could
be seen that eth0 was activated for data capture and it
was operating on normal MTU of 1541. The IP address
was 192.168.50.4. The duration of data capture was 2
hours, 11 minutes, and 57 seconds. There was no packet
dropped neither by libpcap nor by ntop. However, there was
1, 123, 019 packets received by Ntop and only 1, 120, 797
packets were processed. The total number (resp. percentage)
of unicast, broadcast, and multicast packets was 1, 118, 923
(99.8%), 794 (0.1% ), and 1, 080 (0.1%), respectively.
Figure 9. Evidence collected with Ntop when victim computer was under
attack
D. Discussion
1) Analysis of Evidence Collected with Tcpdump: After
comparing the timestamps of the captured evidences with
TCPdump when no attack was launched (timestamp was
23h3mn7s) and when the network was under attack (times-
tamp was 23h17mn1s), it could be seen that the evidence
of a normal traffic flow was captured before launching the
attack on the victim machine.
The IP address used by the source machine transmitted
from subnet 74.125.206.0 over the Internet was on HTTPS
in both cases. The source machine does not seem to maintain
a unique IP address; its IP address appeared to be changing
in fraction of a second. The victim computer’s IP address the
suffixed port number remained the same. It is also observed
that the TCP flags, the packet sequence and acknowledge-
ment numbers, the packets’ length, and the window size
remained the same in both cases. However, line 7 of evidence
collected when the attack was launched shows that there was
an ARP reply claiming to have originated from the second
target (i.e., victim machine) with IP address 192.168.50.7
but with MAC address of 00 : 0C : 29 : 00 : 4f : 2d
which was the MAC address of the attacker machine. In the
same way, line 8 shows another ARP reply claiming to have
originated from the first target (i.e., default gateway) with
IP address 192.168.50.1 but also with the attacker’s MAC
address 00 : 0C : 29 : 00 : 4f : 2d. Hence, something
suspicious must be going on here. This demonstrate that the
MitM by ARP poisoning attack triggered by ettercap was
successfully launched causing the ARP cache poisoning for
both targets.
2) Analysis of Evidences Collected with Wireshark: From
the conversation depicted in Figure 10, it could be seen
that the victim machine was making ARP broadcast asking
for the default gateway. It is also observed that the victim
machine was a dell product from the address column of the
statistics table with shorten form of MAC address 31:ba:fd
and the cisco switch too having shorten form MAC address
of 29:2c:03.
Recall that the victim machine has made a gratuitous ARP
request of the existing default gateway. The Figure 11 shows
Figure 10. Conversation between the switch and the victim machine
conversation between the switch and the victim machine
at that time. The conversation infers that the switch had
acknowledged the existence of the victim machine, added
the MAC-IP address binding to its ARP cache, and made a
broadcast for the default gateway too.
Figure 11. Switch joined broadcast for the default gateway
From the evidence collected with Wireshark when the
victim machine was under attack, we observed that from the
“info” column it was reported “duplicate use of 192.168.50.5
detected”. The Figure 12 shows statistics of conversation
at the time. It could be seen that another MAC address
(34 : 78 : 74) was captured by Wireshark and a duplication
of IP address was reported as shown in Figure 13. It could
be observed that the IP address 192.168.50.1 which was
earlier known to be the IP address of the default gateway
has two MAC address bindings: 58 : 6d : 8f : 93 : 10 : 2e
which is the initial MAC address of default gateway and
00 : 26 : 0b : 34 : 78 : 74 which is a fake MAC address
of a host that does not exist on the network which was the
outcome of the repoison plugins from ettercap. This effect
should consequently result in DoS attack preventing access
to the default gateway.
Figure 12. Conversation when victim computer was under attack
3) Analysis of TCPstat Collected Evidences: From the
TCPstat statistics it could be obviously seen that the esti-
mated traffic rate has increased when the network was under
attack. This increase could be due to increase in ARP replies
the repoison plugin of the ethercap was enabled.
4) Analysis of Evidences Captured with Ntop: It is obvi-
ous to see that the number of unicast during attack increased
abruptly. This could be due to spoofed ARP reply from the
attacker machine to the victim machine.
Figure 13. Duplicate of IP address in MAC-IP address binding
VI. MITIGATING ARP CACHE SPOOFING
In order to mitigate the ARP cache spoofing, the security
features DHCP Snooping and Dynamic ARP Inspection
(DAI) were enabled on the switch. The DHCP Snooping
protects the network by allowing the switch to accept
DHCP response message only from the authorized servers
connected to the trusted interfaces in the switch. DAI helps
preventing ARP poisoning and other ARP-based attacks by
intercepting and verifying the authenticity of any ARP or
ICMP request/reply, and dropping any ARP spoofing that
is beyond the rate-limit configured on untrusted ports (in
our case, this is the port on which the attacker machine is
connected).
In our case, the two features were enabled on VLAN 50
and the Gigabit Ethernet port 1 (gi1/1) of the switch was
configured as a trusted port. The DAI logging buffer size is
set to 1024.
A. Launching Attack Again
At this time both DHCP Snooping and DAI security
features were activated and configured on the switch. Then
the ARP cache spoofing was launched again with ettercap
as described in subsection V-B.
B. Analysis of Mitigation of ARP Cache Spoofing
Obtained results showed that the ARP cache spoofing was
prevented when DHCP snooping and DAI were enabled and
configured on the switch. Although both reposoning arp
and remote browser plugins were selected, session hijack-
ing was not possible as when there was no mitigation. As
the DHCP Snooping and DAI were configured to trust only
ARP request/reply from the port connected to the DHCP
router, the fake ARP request/reply may certainly be dropped
by DAI. Note that we deliberately didn’t configure the
rate limit of incoming ARP packets on untrusted ports in
order to avoid putting the port in an error disable state
which could interfere with the size of data to be collected
in the course of forensics investigation, if there could be any.
VII. CONCLUSION
The primary motivation of this research was to discuss
the likelihood and to establish a baseline approach may
used to mitigate and investigate ARP cache spoofing, Man
in the Middle, host impersonation, Denial of Service, and
session hijacking attacks. The result obtained in this research
showed that mitigation of ARP cache spoofing using DHCP
Snooping and DAI was achievable. This research also intro-
duced TCPdump, wireshark, TCPstat, and Ntop as a useful
tools and techniques to be used in forensics investigation of
ARP cache spoofing attack.
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